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Abstract. That organizations exist in a fluid environment of un-
precedented and discontinuous change seems beyond debate. We
seem to find ourselves immersed in a world in which events have a
tendency to unfold and overtake us in unforeseeable and novel ways
that defy comprehension; a crisis of meaning takes place and conven-
tional sensemaking is disrupted. Our need to imaginatively construct
new meanings that allow us to understand what is going on and to
work out how to respond becomes ever more pressing. We do live
in interesting times. The emergence of the new, however, challenges
current established ways of knowing and opens a creative space for
radical learning to take place. Novelty stimulates the generative pro-
cess by which organizations and individuals learn, adapt to and cope
with the exigencies they face in order to survive and progress. Such
radical learning occurs when creative linguistic interventions in dia-
logue opens up semantic spaces whereby new terms are coined and
old ones broken up, combined and/or redeployed in novel ways, in an
effort to give expression to the fresh circumstances experienced or new
phenomena observed. We call this kind of imaginative linguistic inter-
vention semantic transformation. In this paper we argue that it is this
semantic transformation that promotes radical transformational learn-
ing. Such semantic transformation is predicated on the improvisatory
character of dialogue as a form of communication. We explore how,
through this dialogical process of semantic transformation, we discover
the resources and means to respond to the vagueness and equivocality
experienced, by exploiting language in novel ways in our attempts to
make sense of and account for such experiences.
Keywords. Dialogue; future perfect tense; language games; linguistic
structuring; novelty; radical learning; semantic transformation; sense-
making; stories; web of meaning.
Introduction
We live in interesting times. Old, established orders seem to be dis-
solving, and societies, organizations, and individuals are often con-
fronted by unforeseen, unexpected, and previously unimaginable
happenings that contrive to disrupt and/or unsettle our existing
systems of comprehension. The world we experience is in a state of
constant flux, and fresh challenges constantly appear on the hori-
zon of our awareness that conspire to thwart our understanding and
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confound our established categories of thought. Breakthrough tech-
nologies and social media are transforming our physical environment
and how we interact with each other, having radical consequences
for the way we manage aspirations, relations, and resources. Cli-
mate change and the depletion of natural resources seem to threaten
both the planet and the existing socioeconomic order, creating wider
ramifications for the sustainability of enterprise and for wealth cre-
ation. Globalization, shifting demographics, and mass migration are
creating challenges for countries, businesses, managers, and admin-
istrators at all levels; threatening to redefine boundaries, identities,
markets, and horizons of comprehension. These novel changes and
unforeseen happenings provide a stark reminder that we face a rad-
ically open future in which our organizational worlds appear to be
evolving “in ways that we are not able to conceptualize at present;
ways that go beyond our given cognitive categories”.1
1 Page 50 of: Seidl, D. and D. van
Aaken: 2009, ‘Anticipating Critique and
Occasional Reason: Modes of Reasoning
in the Face of a Radically Open Future’.
In: L. Costanzo and R. MacKay (eds.):
Handbook of Research on Strategy and
Foresight. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward
Elgar, pp. 48–66.
In such challenging times when we are constantly confronted by
widespread equivocality, our need to imaginatively construct new
meanings that allow us to understand what is going on and to work
out how to respond becomes ever more pressing. Against this back-
drop, Weick’s work has been instrumental in drawing our collective
attention to the ongoing processes of sensemaking constantly taking
place in organizations. Sensemaking can be seen as both an individ-
ual cognitive process and a socially situated process,2 whereby equiv-
2 See, e.g.: Brown, A., I. Colville, and A.
Pye: 2015, ‘Making Sense of Sensemak-
ing in Organization Studies’. Organization
Studies 36(2), 265–277.
ocality is reduced and rendered manageable: “people make informed
bets as to ‘what is going on’ and ‘what the story is’ by ruling out a
number of possibilities or ‘might have beens’ ”.3 Whether achieved
3 Page 1203 of: Colville, I., A. Pye,
and M. Carter: 2013, ‘Organizing to
Counter Terrorism: Sensemaking amidst
Dynamic Complexity’. Human Relations
66(9), 1201–1223.
individually or collectively,4 creating plausible stories allows us to
4 In this paper we do not seek to arbi-
trate upon this ontological debate.
come to terms with our current situation by referencing past events
and experiences5 to comprehend present predicaments. Order, pat-
5 See, e.g.: Cunliffe, A. and C. Coup-
land: 2012, ‘From Hero to Villain to
Hero: Making Experience Sensible
through Embodied Narrative Sense-
making’. Human Relations 65(1), 63–88.
tern, and organizational coherence are composed of “moves” taken
within our language games,6 which are manifestations of effective
6 Page 10 of: Lyotard, J.: 1984, The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge. Minneapolis, MN, U.S.A.:
University of Minnesota Press.
sensemaking activities.7 Through these language games, we collec-
7 Page 15 of: Weick, K.: 1995, Sensemak-
ing in Organizations. Thousand Oaks,
CA, U.S.A.: Sage.
tively create a shared web of meaning8 that we continuously reweave
8 Page 100 of: Vygotsky, L.: 2012,
Thought and Language. Eastford, CT,
U.S.A.: Martino Fine Books. Original
edition published in 1934.
to accommodate our past experiences, and it is through this contin-
uous reweaving that organizational realities are forged, maintained,
and sustained out of the “blooming, buzzing confusion”9 of raw lived
9 Page 50 of: James, W.: 1996, Some
Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an
Introduction to Philosophy. Lincoln, NE,
U.S.A.: University of Nebraska Press.
Original edition published in 1911.
experience.
Learning and sensemaking are two mutually constitutive and in-
terdependent elements of this weaving process. Both are “cut from
the same cloth,” but “the patterns of the final garment are somewhat
different”.10 Through sensemaking activities, we are able to contex-
10 Page 185 of: Schwandt, D.: 2005,
‘When Managers Become Philosophers
Integrating Learning With Sensemak-
ing’. Academy of Management Learning &
Education 4(2), 176–192.
tualize and attribute meaning to events and thus learn;11 and from
11 Page 54 of: Weick, K.: 1985, ‘Sources
of Order in Underorganized Systems:
Themes in Recent Organizational The-
ory’. In: Y. Lincoln (ed.): Organizational
Theory and Inquiry: The Paradigm Revolu-
tion. Beverly Hills, CA, U.S.A.: Sage, pp.
106–136.
the resulting knowledge we are able to make sense of other expe-
riences, be they in the past, present, or future. Whilst sensemaking
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is often seen as a retrospective activity,12 relating present moments 12 Page S8 of: Sandberg, J. and H.
Tsoukas: 2015, ‘Making Sense of the
Sensemaking Perspective: Its Con-
stituents, Limitations, and Opportuni-
ties for further Development’. Journal of
Organizational Behaviour 36(S1), S6–S32.
of experience to past moments of socialization to create meaning,13
13 Page 111 of: Weick (1995).
it also allows us to extrapolate and make sense of the future. As
Weick acknowledges, sensemaking is a “mixture of retrospect and
prospect”.14 Prospective sensemaking occurs through the extrapola-
14 Page 29 of: Weick (1995).tion from past experiences by which we are able to “retrospect about
events yet to happen”,15 cognitively casting ourselves into a partic- 15 Page 623 of: Gioia, D., K. Corley,
and T. Fabbri: 2002, ‘Revising the Past
(While Thinking in the Future Perfect
Tense)’. Journal of Organizational Change
Management 15(6), 622–634.
16 Page 91 of: MacKay, R.: 2009, ‘Strate-
gic Foresight: Counterfactual and
Prospective Sensemaking in Enacted
Environments’. In: L. Costanzo and
R. MacKay (eds.): Handbook of Research
on Strategy and Foresight. Cheltenham,
U.K.: Edward Elgar, pp. 90–113.
ular future, giving it meaning and responding pre-emptively, as if
it were predetermined.16 However, if “the future is no longer a be-
nign and distant place that can be understood retrospectively”,17 just
17 Page 107 of: MacKay (2009).
quite how we are able to make sense of things when confronted by
the genuinely novel and/or by unexpected events that conspire to
disrupt our sensemaking process remains unclear. We may find it
impossible to think in the future perfect tense and so be at a loss as to
know how to proceed.18 Making sense of a radically open future has
18 See, e.g.: Wilson, T. and D. Gilbert:
2005, ‘Affective Forecasting: Knowing
What to Want’. Current Directions in
Psychological Science 14(3), 131–134.
become a pressing issue for organizational researchers.19
19 See, e.g.: Brown et al. (2015); and
Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015).
In this article, we seek to explore just how we are able to proceed
when challenged by previously unimaginable events that confound
our attempts to make sense of what is happening. Since Weick’s 1988
work, there has been a steady stream of empirical research illustrat-
ing the consequences for individuals and organizations of unforeseen
events that have led to crises in which sensemaking has been dis-
rupted.20 Weick describes these as “cosmology episodes”21 in which 20 See, e.g.: Maitlis, S. and S. Sonen-
shein: 2010, ‘Sensemaking in Crisis and
Change: Inspiration and Insights From
Weick (1988)’. Journal of Management
Studies 47(3), 551–580.
21 Page 51 of: Weick (1985).
the everyday cosmos we have created is severely disrupted and “peo-
ple suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational,
orderly system”.22 Researchers have sought to understand retrospec-
22 Page 633 of: Weick, K.: 1993, ‘The
Collapse of Sensemaking in Organi-
zations: The Mann Gulch Disaster’.
Administrative Science Quarterly 38(4),
628–652.
tively, using interviews and secondary data (often documentation
from official inquiries), why and how normal sensemaking activities
are disrupted by extreme events. Understandably, researchers have
also sought to make sense of these events and to project them into
the future so that organizations can build resilience to better cope
with similar situations.23 Additionally, the idea of managerial sense- 23 See, e.g.: Weick, K. and K. Sutcliffe:
2007, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient
Performance in the Age of Uncertainty.
San Francisco, CA, U.S.A.: Jossey-Bass.
giving (communicating the meaning of dramatic events to others)
that takes place when the unimagined has disrupted sensemaking
has become a greater concern.24 Yet as Sandberg and Tsoukas point 24 See, e.g.: Maitlis, S. and T. Lawrence:
2007, ‘Triggers and Enablers of Sense-
giving in Organizations’. Academy of
Management Journal 50(1), 57–84.
out, “a ‘sensegiver’ is also a ‘sensemaker’ ”, leaving the question of
how the sensegiver is able to make sense of things in the first place
unanswered.25 This is especially crucial since “[w]hat makes such an 25 Page S24 of: Sandberg and Tsoukas
(2015).[cosmology] episode so shattering is that both the sense of what is
occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together”.26 26 Page 633 of: Weick (1993).
Within the existing literature, consideration of just how sensemaking
can be actively restored when such unimagined events disrupt the
sensemaking process remains relatively unexplored.
We argue that in order to restore sensemaking activities (both ret-
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rospective and prospective), a new past, a new present, and a new
future that are all radically different to the ones previously estab-
lished have to be linguistically constructed. Accepting that sensemak-
ing is “manifest in language”,27 we draw upon theoretical work that27 Page 588 of: Gephart, R.: 1997, ‘Haz-
ardous Measures: An Interpretive
Textual Analysis of Quantitative Sense-
making during Crises’. Journal of
Organizational Behaviour 18(S1), 583–622.
focuses on language and dialogue, to illustrate how, when sensemak-
ing is disrupted, we are nevertheless still able to improvise with the
grammars (or rules) of our language games and thus transform our
shared web of meaning, such that sensemaking (and learning) can
be restored. We refer to this process in which old ways of knowing
are not simply adapted but are replaced by new forms of knowing,
through a process of linguistic improvisation, as semantic transforma-
tion. Semantic transformation involves a dialogical process in which
fresh semantic spaces are creatively opened up, whereby new terms
are coined and old ones broken up, combined, and/or redeployed
in novel ways, in an effort to express the fresh circumstances experi-
enced or new phenomena observed. It is through this process of se-
mantic transformation that we are able to reconfigure our prevailing
patterns of meanings such that our horizons of comprehension are
extended, rendering what was previously unthought as comprehensi-
ble and thus re-taming “the ‘wild profusion of things’ ”.28 We define28 Page 1203 of: Colville et al. (2013).
the kind of learning that occurs through this semantic transforma-
tion as radical learning in contrast to the incremental learning that takes
place through our ongoing sensemaking.29 Radical learning stretches29 The use of these terms for two dif-
fering forms of learning was used by
Miner and Mezias (1996).
our imagination, taking us beyond established linguistic categories of
thought that limit what is already known. Through semantic trans-
formation, we create new stories that replace the ones that have been
found wanting and pave the way for more adequate explanations of
experienced phenomena, thereby allowing our sensemaking activities
to be restored.
We begin by considering how the emergence of novelty disrupts
our sensemaking activities, punctuating the ongoing process of learn-
ing/becoming/organizing.30 Central to our narrative is the essential30 Clegg, S., M. Kornberger, and C.
Rhodes: 2005, ‘Learning / Becoming
/ Organizing’. Organization 12(2),
147–167.
role played by language in the related ongoing processes of sense-
making and learning, but as our narrative proceeds we place partic-
ular emphasis on the searching role of dialogue. We maintain that
dialogue plays a unique role in our evolving language games. The
flexibility and addressivity to be found within dialogue allow us to
improvise, and it is this creative freedom that enables us to adapt
our language and transform our web of meaning. By so doing, we
are able to create a language of the future31 that allows us to accom-31 Feyerabend, P.: 1993, Against Method:
Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowl-
edge. London, U.K.: Verso, 3 edition.
modate the novel. Without dialogue, there would be no semantic
transformation and therefore no radical learning. Through dialogue,
we are collectively able to respond when we can no longer think in
the future perfect tense, and our sensemaking activities have been
radical learning through semantic transformation 5
disrupted. Importantly, it is the semantic transformation we are able
to achieve through dialogue that provides us with opportunities for
the radical learning that we increasingly need to cope when faced by
a radically open future.
The Novelty Stimulus
The idea that the emergence of novelty disrupts conventional wisdom
and understanding, leading to new learning, is well established; be-
ing captured in our shared imagery of Archimedes’ Eureka Moment.
An attraction to novelty and the impulse to assimilate and under-
stand it are central to our speculative and scientific achievements.32
32 See, e.g.: Berlyne, D.: 1950, ‘Novelty
and Curiosity as Determinants of
Exploratory Behaviour’. British Journal
of Psychology 41(1–2), 68–80.
Novel events generate curiosity, stimulate our imagination, and pro-
vide “a sense of what might be”.33 The unfamiliar or unexpected
33 Page 37 of: Whitehead, A.: 1956,
Modes of Thought. New York, NY,
U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press.
Original edition published in 1938.
provides a source of productive otherness34 that interrupts our ongo- 34 See, e.g.: Cooper, R.: 1989, ‘Mod-
ernism, Post Modernism and Organiza-
tional Analysis 3: The Contribution of
Jacques Derrida’. Organization Studies
10(4), 479–502.
ing sensemaking efforts; and whilst we often find this psychologically
unsettling,35 it nevertheless provides a valuable opportunity to revisit
35 Page 943 of: Tsoukas, H.: 2009, ‘A
Dialogical Approach to the Creation
of New Knowledge in Organizations’.
Organization Science 20(6), 941–957.
our established understanding and to learn more about ourselves and
our relationships with the environment. As Chia highlights, “[t]he
element of surprise, and hence creativity and novelty, is necessarily
built into the very core of change and transformation”.36
36 Page 223 of: Chia, R.: 1999, ‘A ‘Rhi-
zomic’ Model of Organizational Change
and Transformation: Perspectives from
a Metaphysics of Change’. British
Journal of Management 10(3), 209–227.
Novelty is all-pervasive in the raw flux of ongoing events that con-
stitute our reality. The presence (or even omnipresence) of novelty
has been highlighted by many writers.37 Novelty is recognized as a
37 See, e.g.: Bergson, H.: 1998, Creative
Evolution. Mineola, NY, U.S.A.: Dover
Publications, Inc. Original edition
published in 1911; and March, J.: 2010,
The Ambiguities of Experience. Ithaca, NY,
U.S.A.: Cornell University Press.
defining characteristic of complex systems and central to all forms of
life.38 Yet, despite acknowledging the ubiquity and generative qual-
38 See, e.g.: Crosby, D.: 2005, Novelty.
Lanham, MD, U.S.A.: Lexington Books.
ities of novelty, organizational theory has traditionally focused on
counteracting novelty; creating stability and removing variation to
produce an orderly and more predictable world. Organizing is ulti-
mately about the reduction in variety and equivocality.39 As Taylor
39 See, e.g.: Weick, K. and F. Westley:
1996, ‘Organizational Learning: Af-
firming an Oxymoron’. In: S. Clegg, C.
Hardy, and W. Nord (eds.): Handbook
of Organization Studies. London, U.K.:
Sage, pp. 440–458.
and Van Every point out, management endeavors to control organi-
zational processes so that a particular reality is achieved and main-
tained to the exclusion of possible others.40 In trying to achieve this,
40 Pages ix–x of: Taylor, J. and E. van
Every: 2000, The Emergent Organization:
Communication as Its Site and Surface.
Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge.
the traditional approach to organizing “treats the new as a special
case of things already understood”,41 creating “self-defeating filters
41 Page 194 of: Feyerabend (1993).
that reduce novelty”.42 Such an approach fosters what Veblen termed
42 Page 210 of: March (2010).
“learnt incapacity”; in our attempts to eradicate novelty, we stifle
our ability to learn. As March highlights, the opportunity for learn-
ing emerges only when our present moments of experience can no
longer be assimilated into the frames we invented to encapsulate the
experiences of history.43 43 Page 51 of: March (2010).
Perhaps not surprisingly given both its generative and disruptive
qualities, the concept of novelty has proved problematic within the
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organizational literature. The work of March suggests that efforts to
provide an adequate theoretical explanation of novelty have proved
unsatisfactory.44 Schumpeter’s assertion that an explanation of nov-44 See, e.g.: March (2010).
elty was “the greatest unmet scientific challenge”45 seems to have45 Page 356 of: Becker, M., T. Knudsen,
and J. March: 2006, ‘Schumpeter,
Winter, and the Sources of Novelty’.
Industrial and Corporate Change 15(2),
353–371.
gone unheeded; it remains a ‘residual category’ in organizational the-
orizing.46 Novelty is a very slippery and amorphous term, and this
46 See, e.g.: Joas, H.: 1996, Creativity of
Action. Chicago, IL, U.S.A.: University
of Chicago Press.
is partly due to its temporal nature; once it emerges, the very qual-
ities that made it novel begin to evaporate. March’s description of
novelty as “deviation from established procedures or knowledge”47
47 Page 75 of: March (2010). explains neither its origin nor its continual emergence. Novel events
are those that we cannot accommodate within our ‘decontextualized
ideal’48 of the universal, the general, and the timeless. Paradoxically,48 See, e.g.: Toulmin, S.: 1990, Cosmopo-
lis. Chicago, IL, U.S.A.: University of
Chicago Press.
it is our ongoing battle to order and organize our world that creates
the conditions for novelty to emerge.49 Deleuze suggests that “differ-49 Page 91 of: March (2010).
ence lies between two repetitions” and it is mindfulness that “draws
something new from repetition”;50 novelty comes out of the mundane50 Page 97 of: Deleuze, G.: 2004, Dif-
ference and Repetition. London, U.K.:
Continuum.
and the repetitive. Thus whilst novelty is all-pervasive in the raw flux
of ongoing events, it emerges from within our consciousness, at the
edge of human understanding when prediction has failed and causal
mechanisms cannot adequately explain the effects observed.51 This51 See, e.g.: Capek, M.: 1978, ‘Towards a
Widening of the Notion of Causality’.
In: J. Sibley and P. Gunter (eds.): Process
Philosophy: Basic Writings. Washing-
ton, D.C., U.S.A.: University Press of
America, pp. 79–103.
means that novel events are simply those that we do not expect and
that disrupt our ongoing sensemaking and organizing activities.
Thus understood, it is the unexpected that serves as a novel stim-
ulus, providing “the generative and productive friction that disrupts
the received categories of “business as usual” and enables the re-
definition, redeployment, and recombination of resources”.52 This52 Page 1151 of: Vedres, B. and D. Stark:
2010, ‘Structural Folds: Generative
Disruption in Overlapping Groups’.
American Journal of Sociology 115(4),
1150–1190.
in turn generates novel responses: “unconventional, improbable, wild
ideas and actions” that provide the sort of “major innovations and
responses to change”53 considered essential for organizational sur-
53 Page 205 of: March, J.: 2006, ‘Ra-
tionality, Foolishness, and Adaptive
Intelligence’. Strategic Management
Journal 27(3), 201–214.
vival. Such responses constitute what we call radical learning, a form
of learning that does not simply alter the “movement of the waters
on the river-bed” of our collective knowledge, but shifts “the bed
itself”.54 The work of Clegg et al. and Hernes and Irgens reminds54 Page 15 of: Wittgenstein, L.: 1969,
On Certainty. New York, NY, U.S.A.:
HarperCollins.
us that while both learning and organizing are ongoing accomplish-
ments, this does not mean that they always proceed incrementally.5555 Clegg et al. (2005); and Hernes, T.
and E. Irgens: 2012, ‘Keeping Things
Mindfully on Track: Organizational
Learning under Continuity’. Manage-
ment Learning 44(3), 253–266.
Within this ongoing, stuttering procession, novel events will appear,
disturbing our taken-for-granted conceptualizations and encouraging
us to doubt and question our existing cognitive commitments. Such
events highlight that the future is not constrained by existing ways of
knowing, that our knowledge is necessarily incomplete, and that at
times major revisions of our conceptual schemes become necessary.
Thus, learning can be understood to proceed both continuously
and discontinuously.56 Clegg et al. recognize that “[l]earning can be
56 See, e.g.: Berends, H. and I. Lammers:
2010, ‘Explaining Discontinuity in
Organizational Learning: A Process
Analysis’. Organization Studies 31(8),
1045–1068.
simultaneously repetition and difference”.5757 Page 156 of: Clegg et al. (2005).
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Seen as the latter, radical learning is by definition non-cumulative,
representing saltations — radical shifts or transitions that interrupt
the ongoing and progressive refinement of organizational knowl-
edge and routines by short-circuiting established stimulus-response
patterns.58 It is novelty that disrupts the incremental process of learn- 58 See, e.g.: Garud, R., R. Dunbar, and
C. Bartel: 2011, ‘Dealing with Unusual
Experiences: A Narrative Perspective on
Organizational Learning’. Organization
Science 22(3), 587–601.
ing/becoming/organizing making us aware that we can no longer
respond habitually to the new situations we face.59 Importantly, it is
59 See, e.g.: Weick and Sutcliffe (2007).
the disruption of our sensemaking activities that paves the way for
new forms of knowledge and action. Whitehead’s assertion that the
history of thought is “a tragic mixture of vibrant disclosure and of
deadening closure”60 highlights the difference between radical learn- 60 Page 81 of: Whitehead (1956).
ing and a more incremental form of learning that rests upon existing
ways of knowing and sensemaking.
To understand how novelty actively disrupts the living fabric of
learning/becoming/organizing we need to acquaint ourselves with
the evolving linguistic system from which it is fabricated.
Linguistic Structuring and Language Games: Creating Stories
Language is usually understood to be a neutral “means” for commu-
nicating already-formed thought. Yet, this is not the case. To concep-
tualize language as simply representational, providing “a system of
normatively identical forms” is “merely a scientific abstraction”.61 61 Page 98 of: Voloshinov, V.: 1986,
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.
Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.: Harvard
University Press. Original edition
published in 1929.
Language actively configures our all-too-familiar world so that we
wittingly or otherwise construct and reconstruct it through our lin-
guistic structuring. Our language games constitute “a continuous
generative process”62 that transforms a “difficult and infrangible 62 Page 98 of: Voloshinov (1986).
reality into a resource at our disposal”.63 “Words induce stable con- 63 Page 517 of: Chia, R.: 2000, ‘Discourse
Analysis as Organizational Analysis’.
Organization 7(3), 513–518.
nections [. . . ] to which people can orientate”,64 enabling us to make
64 Page 128 of: Weick (1985).sense of our experiences and thus bring order to the ongoing process
of organizing.65 65 See, e.g.: Cooper (1989).
Language creates the shared web of meaning that gives texture
and significance to our lives, allowing us to make sense of what is
going on. Importantly, the act of attributing meaning “always im-
plies a degree of generalization”,66 and through generalizing we 66 Page 91 of: Vygotsky (2012).
create abstractions that solidify the boundaries of our knowledge. It
is through storytelling that our stable abstractions are created and
maintained. Stories infuse past events with meaning,67 connecting
67 Page 480 of: Gabriel, Y.: 1995, ‘The
Unmanaged Organization: Stories,
Fantasies and Subjectivity’. Organization
Studies 16(3), 477–501.the past with the present and allowing us to imagine cause and effect
relationships.68 Our stories are myths providing creative representa- 68 See, e.g.: Boje, D., D. Fedor, and
K. Rowland: 1982, ‘Myth Making: A
Qualitative Step in OD Interventions’.
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 18(1),
17–28.
tions that allow us to organize our interconnected lives and against
which future actions can be collectively determined. Stories allow us
to share knowledge and apply existing knowledge in new contexts:
we learn from our own inventions,69 or paraphrasing J.L. Austin, 69 Page 51 of: March (2010).
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learning occurs when we are able to do new things with words.
Doing new things with words means altering our stories and nar-
ratives. This is an ongoing process in which we all participate; main-
taining, extending, and adapting our shared web of meaning. And
yet as Wittgenstein notes, “the limits of my language mean the limits
of my world”.70 Language makes the world accessible to us, but it70 Page 74 of: Wittgenstein, L.: 1922,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London,
U.K.: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &
Co., Ltd.
also constrains us. “People make sense of things by seeing a world
on which they already imposed what they believe”,71 and it is only
71 Page 15 of: Weick (1995).
72 See, e.g.: Brown, A., Y. Gabriel,
and S. Gherardi: 2009, ‘Storytelling
and Change: An Unfolding Story’.
Organization 16(3), 323–333.
when we use words imaginatively and play games with our language
that the way we see the world can change. Thus understood, both
organizational stability and organizational change are necessarily
linguistic accomplishments.72
Despite these two competing functions, Whitehead’s fallacy of the
perfect dictionary highlights our tendency to forget that our linguis-
tic structuring is always a work in progress. While our abstractions
may appear concrete, they are always incomplete, partial, and thus
open to revision. Importantly, it is the unavoidable and inevitable
emergence of novelty that reminds us that our gradual progression
toward conceptual closure is a chimera. It highlights that our stories
are selectively built upon the past and that the generative memory
provided by their accumulation is necessarily incomplete.73 Within73 Page 591 of: Garud et al. (2011).
our stories, the process of signification has already taken place. The
signifier has determined what is significant from the past; events
and characters have been selected and woven into a story with a plot
that explains what has happened and what is happening. The story’s
narrator has thought in the future perfect tense and woven a story
foreshadowing the future. Our linguistic structuring creates a lan-
guage of the past; built on Historical Foresight74 which we rely upon74 Page 88 of: Whitehead, A.: 1967,
Adventures of Ideas. New York, NY,
U.S.A.: The Free Press. Original edition
published in 1933.
to construct a particular future to which we can respond. We may
think in the future perfect, but to do so we have to create a particular
version of the past.75 Novel events remind us that our sensemaking75 See, e.g.: Gioia et al. (2002).
relies upon a past we have created. They disrupt our ongoing sense-
making activities and point toward the inadequacy of our existing
knowledge (expressed in language and captured through stories). If
sensemaking is about creating a coherent story, how do we proceed
when our language games collapse and there appears no possibil-
ity of establishing linguistic coherence? In such times, we need “an
entirely different system of grammar”,76 or “a language of the fu-
76 Page 298 of: Tosey, P., M. Visser,
and M. Saunders: 2011, ‘The Origins
and Conceptualizations of ‘Triple-
Loop’ Learning: A Critical Review’.
Management Learning 43(3), 291–307. ture” in which we “must learn to argue with unexplained terms and to use
sentences for which no clear rules of usage are yet available”.7777 Page 194 of: Feyerabend (1993).
Yet it is important to appreciate that we can only be “reflexive
within the discursive quasi-constraints” imposed on us by the “nar-
ratives on which [we] draw, and to which [we] are subject”.78 We
78 Page 738 of: Brown, A.: 2006, ‘A
Narrative Approach to Collective
Identities’. Journal of Management Studies
43(4), 731–753.
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cannot simply invent a new language; we are locked into our existing
language. The stories we require to make sense of the world rely on
the linguistic system we have inherited. Thus, language seems to be
cast as both hero (language of the future) and villain (language of
the past) and whilst our language may be found wanting, we do not
have an alternative. When sensemaking is disrupted, it is to linguistic
experimentation that we must turn and it is through the creative pro-
cess of dialogue that we find fresh ways of adapting the rules of our
language games and thus to transform how we see the world.
Dialogue and Semantic Transformation
Despite the importance currently placed on understanding organiza-
tions as “discursive spaces”,79 management literature seems to strug- 79 Page 10 of: Brown (2006).
gle to explain how we “change dominating concepts and images of
thought, to de-frame and think the unthinkable”.80 Bakhtin refers to 80 Page 156 of: Clegg et al. (2005).
this as the “semantic transformation of existence”.81 The material world 81 Page 165 (our emphasis) of: Bakhtin,
M.: 1986a, ‘The Problem of Speech Gen-
res’. In: C. Emerson and M. Holquist
(eds.): Speech Genres & Other Late Essays.
Austin, TX, U.S.A.: University of Texas
Press, pp. 60–103.
remains unchanged, but the events we experience (whether past,
present, or future) acquire a completely different sense and meaning.
When complete, the explanatory stories that have established our
rules of action are rewritten, and thus learning has taken place.82 Yet
82 Page 14 of: March (2010).
it remains unclear just how we learn to do new things with words
when our existing language and stories are called into question. We
argue that it is through active participation in our language games
that radical learning can take place; when novel stimuli bring about
the “deterritorialization of language”.83 It is this deliberate strain- 83 Page 99 of: Deleuze, G. and F. Guat-
tari: 1987, A Thousand Plateaus: Capital-
ism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis, MN,
U.S.A.: University of Minnesota Press.
ing of language to give expression to the as-yet-unarticulated that
differentiates radical learning from incremental learning.
To understand how language can be used in this way, it is useful
to conceptualize language as having two different forms: dialogue
and monologue. The first comprises the verbal utterances we use in
informal conversations (and now in digital equivalents), when com-
municating directly with others. The second utilizes formal styles
of language (that are typically written). Although the form of each
varies depending upon context, they can be differentiated on the ba-
sis of their differing functions.84 Within dialogue we index (signal or 84 Page 89 (adapted) of: Wertsch, J.:
1985, Vygotsky and the Social Formation of
Mind. Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.: Harvard
University Press.
indicate), while monologue allows us to specify meaning (signify or
symbolize). Similarly dialogue has a social communicative function,
whilst monologue has a disembodied, intellectual function. Dialogue
is processional — every exchange is a development of the one before
and a preparation for the one following — whilst monologue is suc-
cessional.85
85 Page 53 of: Ingold, T.: 2011, Being
Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowlegde
and Description. London, U.K.: Rout-
ledge.
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Using these distinctions, our web of meaning is formalized and main-
tained through monologues (abstractions/stories) whilst it is pre-
pared, generated, and embodied within the dialogues that capture
our ongoing and ever-evolving experiences. Thus, dialogue precedes
monologue and our language games constitute a dynamic, linguistic
system with primary and secondary impulses that are “not sepa-
rate, static structures but actively constitute each other”.86 There is86 Page 1699 of: Cooper, R.: 2005, ‘Rela-
tionality’. Organization Studies 26(11),
1689–1710.
a top-down process in which meaning is given to experiences and at
the same time a bottom-up process in which experience changes the
web of meaning. The first is defined as monoglossia, the second is het-
eroglossia.87 Monoglossia is synonymous with linguistic structuring,87 Page 17 of: Morris, P.: 1994, ‘Intro-
duction’. In: P. Morris (ed.): The Bakhtin
Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin,
Medvedev, and Voloshinov. London, U.K.:
E. Arnold, pp. 1–24.
while heteroglossia captures the indeterminacy and subjectivity of
individual lived experience. The resulting enfolded and entangled
whole is the “tension filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the
life of language”.88 Our sensemaking is both dependent upon and88 Page 272 of: Bakhtin, M.: 1981, ‘Dis-
course in the Novel’. In: M. Holquist
(ed.): The Dialogic Imagination: Four
Essays. Austin, TX, U.S.A.: University of
Texas Press, pp. 259–421.
constrained by the pre-existing monologues available to us. This is
our language of the past. But at any time, novel stimuli may puncture
our web of meaning, thereby creating a crisis of interpretation, or
a cosmology episode. Such events leave us needing to express and
communicate things not catered for by established formal language.
In such circumstances we instinctively turn to dialogue to experiment
and to create our language of the future.
Dialogue is a co-creative, aesthetic endeavor, within which mean-
ing is not something transmitted, rather meaning is arrived at through
novel and experimental attempts at articulating dwelt experience. Di-
alogue allows us to ‘wayfind’89 toward shared meaning. In dialogue,
89 See, e.g.: Ingold, T.: 2000, The Per-
ception of the Environment: Essays in
Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. London,
U.K.: Routledge.
accepted meaning is discarded; we simply “look at things” together
and explore them.90 We become aware of each other’s thoughts, even
90 Page 821 of: Raelin, J.: 2012, ‘The
Manager as Facilitator of Dialogue’.
Organization 20(6), 818–839.
if meaning is not yet established. Formal language rules are sec-
ondary to the utterance,91 as we collectively stumble around in search
91 Page 74 of: Bakhtin, M.: 1986b, ‘To-
ward a Methodology for the Human
Sciences’. In: C. Emerson and M.
Holquist (eds.): Speech Genres & Other
Late Essays. Austin, TX, U.S.A.: Univer-
sity of Texas Press, pp. 159–172.
of meaning; improvising with words and groping our way toward
the creation of a new language, a new term, or a new expression that
is adequate to capture our experience.92 Tentatively we may begin92 A trivial illustration of this is the
emergence of the term ‘selfie’ to de-
scribe a social phenomenon made
possible by new technologies in which
people take photos of themselves using
mobile devices with the intention of
sharing them with friends using the
internet. The term ‘selfie’ is now well
established (being included in the Ox-
ford English Dictionary) and arguably
its emergence has shaped behavioural
norms.
by reconfiguring old words and inventing new ones, or combining
them, thus creating the possibility for new meanings. Eventually we
collectively figure out how to reconfigure our language, removing the
novelty that had emerged and stabilizing our web of meaning with
new stories. This is the intricate process of semantic transformation
that is associated with radical learning.
Radical Learning: Improvising with Words through Dialogue
Stabilizing the web of meaning requires what Feyerabend termed
fundamental conceptual change, presupposing “new world-views
radical learning through semantic transformation 11
and new languages capable of expressing them”.93 We suggest our 93 Page 193 of: Feyerabend (1993).
new language emerges from within Bakthin’s “tension filled unity”94 94 Page 272 of: Bakhtin (1981).
that exists at the confluence of our two linguistic streams. Dialogue
is natural to us. As socio-linguistic creatures we learn from an early
age to use the linguistic tools available to us to share and make sense
of what we experience with those around us. When our language
games collapse, we instinctively draw on our innate linguistic in-
stincts and skills, so much so that from relatively early childhood we
redeploy these innate abilities to create inner dialogues that allow
us to explore our experiences privately.95 Whether collectively or in- 95 See, e.g.: Vygotsky (2012).
dividually, we can surprise ourselves by revealing the latent within
our capacities, through a spontaneous reaction “uncontaminated
by a directing image”,96 Our language games are not adapted but
96 Page 1001 of: Cooper, R.: 1976, ‘The
Open Field’. Human Relations 29(11),
999–1017.
rather reconstructed, growing organically from our primitive forms
of language.97
97 Vygotsky (2012, page 72) defines
primitive languages as ones that do not
function as the carrier of concepts.
Dialogue creates social relationships, providing “a bridge thrown
between myself and another”.98 It is this social function, or addres- 98 Page 86 of: Voloshinov (1986).
sivity,99 that creates a modality of interaction, the “tacit property of 99 Page 95 of: Bakhtin (1986b).
100 Page 944 of: Tsoukas (2009).the dialogical situation, indicating the relational aspect of commu-
nication”.100 This communication about communication allows a
speech partner to tacitly indicate “what sort of utterance his utter-
ance is to be taken as”.101 We learn these metapragmatics intuitively, 101 Page 944 of: Tsoukas (2009).
and they allow us to navigate through dialogic exchange. Dialogues
are intrinsically improvisational, and what emerges from them is
never clear. They are prospective, searching exchanges which we
work to maintain. Almost without thinking, we help each other out;
remaining sensitive to the others’ emotional responses and constantly
adapting. We use different styles of language (genres), intuitively se-
lected to meet the conditions of the interaction.102 Within the board- 102 Page 64 of: Bakhtin (1986b).
room a different style of dialogue is adopted to that we might use at
the water cooler, but we can and do mix things up and in doing so
often surprise ourselves. A joke or a casual aside allows us to man-
age the social environment (perhaps diffusing tensions, patch up
strained relationships, or encouraging radical thinking) or say some-
thing that could not be expressed explicitly or directly. Addressivity
does not simply relate to the audience but also to the social situation
and topic, all shaping how the dialogue proceeds. However, addres-
sivity does not guarantee understanding. Rather, we create workable
relations that allow actors to agree how to proceed: the meaning of a
particular utterance “amounts to understanding its novelty and not
to recognizing its identity”.103 103 Page 68 of: Voloshinov (1986).
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It is the recognition of difference that allows us to “understand the
other in dialogue” and to potentially “alter our own understand-
ing”.104 This final point warrants reiterating; dialogues do not nec-104 Page 943 of: Tsoukas (2009).
essarily create a unity of understanding. When faced with the dis-
continuity produced by a novel stimulus, individuals may not be
able to agree what is happening or how to proceed (to create a single
narrative). Nevertheless, in dialogue polyphony is not a problem,
voices are “combined but not merged”.105 Multiple voices may foster
105 Page 516 of: Shotter, J.: 2008, ‘Dial-
ogism and Polyphony in Organizing
Theorizing in Organization Studies:
Action Guiding Anticipations and
the Continuous Creation of Novelty’.
Organization Studies 29(4), 501–524.
a collective understanding that goes beyond the sum of individual
knowledge.106
106 See, e.g.: Weick, K. and K. Roberts:
1993, ‘Collective Mind in Organizations:
Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks’.
Administrative Science Quarterly 38(3),
357–381.
Within dialogue, grammar and structure play second fiddle to mean-
ing and emotions: metaphor, simile, irony, intonation, gestures, body
language, communal language (in jokes, euphemisms, code switch-
ing, nicknames), silence, and repetition are used instinctively. Speech
is “much more flexible, plastic and free”107 than other forms of com-107 Page 79 of: Bakhtin (1986a).
munication, and it is this that allows us to improvise. “To think is to
grasp a metaphor”,108 and when faced by novelty we instinctively108 Page 238 of: Pinker, S.: 2007, The Stuff
of Thought: Language as a Window into
Human Nature. London, U.K.: Penguin
Group.
make ideas tangible by using metaphorical imagery. To extend our
web of meaning, we stretch envelopes and think outside the box, or al-
low others to do so. Through dialogue, we are able to hijack words
and twist their meaning to accommodate our intent. Thus, our com-
puters get viruses, our phones are hacked, and we operate on a default
setting. By improvising, we create linguistic hybrids that enable us
to express things that would be “otherwise inexpressible”.109 In109 Page 241 of: Pinker (2007).
this process, our formal language is stretched, twisted, and made
to groan so that it is malleable to a particular reality.110 When exist-110 Pages xxi–xxiv of: Massumi, B.: 2005,
‘Introduction’. In: B. Massumi (ed.): A
Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze
and Guattari. London, U.K.: Routledge,
pp. xiii–xxxix.
ing stories fail us, we use these linguistic skills to create what Boje
calls antenarratives: “non-linear, incoherent, collective, unplotted, and
pre-narrative speculation”.111 Such fragments of meaning provide
111 Page 1 of: Boje, D.: 2001, Narrative
Methods for Organizational and Com-
munication Research. London, U.K.:
Sage.
an “emergent speculation about what may be happening” (Garud et
al., 2011: 591). As we tentatively try to come to terms with the novel,
although we might stumble or stutter, we construct a rudimentary
language providing the new words to create new worlds. Initially we
might not be saying anything meaningful; our new words “sound
absurd at first but [. . . ] become perfectly reasonable once the con-
nections are made”.112 Collectively we establish what a new word112 Page 193 of: Feyerabend (1993).
means, placing it at the “centre of numerous lines connecting it with
other words, sentences, bits of reasoning, gestures”.113 Using our113 Page 193 of: Feyerabend (1993).
114 Page 41 of: Gabriel, Y.: 2000, Story-
telling in Organizations: Facts, Fictions,
and Fantasies. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
University Press.
new words and meanings, new stories begin to emerge as “a collage
from a complex intersubjective process”.114 Plots take shape and with
them a wider range of behaviors and social mediation. By moving
between “salient details and plausible plots”,115 truly radical learn-
115 Page 591 of: Garud et al. (2011). ing begins to emerge. Gradually we stabilize our existing web of
meaning, weaving our new plots into it and creating a new everyday
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cosmology to recreate the coherence destroyed by the novel stimu-
lus. Our ongoing sensemaking activities are restored, though they
have changed substantially; reflecting Deleuze’s repetition and differ-
ence. The new languages we have developed give rise to the different
world-views presupposed in Feyerabend’s fundamental conceptual
change. Existence has been semantically transformed and radical
learning has taken place; we “behold the universe through the eyes of
another”,116 and importantly, we have found a way to make sense of
116 Chapter 2 of: Proust, M.: 1993,
In Search of Lost Time, Volume V: The
Captive. New York, NY, U.S.A.: Random




As we have already acknowledged, in these interesting times, the
need to better understand how we make sense of a radically open
future is considered pressing. Weick’s (1993) seminal work on the
Mann Gulch fire vividly draws our attention to the fact that novel
or unexpected events can lead to the collapse of sensemaking. Like
many researchers who have followed in Weick’s footsteps, he offers
a plausible and coherent story that explains what had happened and
how similar events might be avoided in the future. His narrative is
an artifact of his own sensemaking which has also enabled others to
make sense of what happens during cosmology episodes when we
can no longer think in the future perfect tense and engage in sense-
making activities. What the vast majority of published work shows
is that irrespective of our focus (be it past, present, or future), our
sensemaking is built on historical foresight; the way we get to grips
with the future is by learning from the past. It makes the future a
“special case of things already understood”.117 The almost poetic 117 Page 194 of: Feyerabend (1993).
question used by Weick, “How can I know what I think till I see what
I say?”,118 has become the recipe of organizational sensemaking that 118 Page 106 of: Wallas, G.: 1926, The
Art of Thought. New York, NY, U.S.A.:
Harcourt Brace.
reminds us it is a retrospective linguistic activity. Whilst conversa-
tions around the nature of prospective sensemaking are ongoing, we
echo Gioia, pointing back to Weick’s seminal work: sensemaking is
achieved when we are able to create a plausible narrative that links
the past, present, and future.119
119 Gioia, D.: 2006, ‘On Weick: An
Appreciation’. Organization Studies
27(11), 1709–1721.
Whilst learning from the past enables us to manage similar events
(should they occur), we exclude other events that do not enter our
imagination. By definition, sensemaking creates a blind spot: to tame
James’ blooming, buzzing confusion, we compromise and (consciously
or unconsciously) exclude possible futures that currently are unimag-
inable. It is the inevitable emergence of the unexpected that reminds
us that all our sensemaking activities and the learning they gener-
ate are incomplete. Unfortunately, it is often crises that force us to
reflect upon our existing ways of knowing. The Titantic, the Wall
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Street Crash, Bhopal, Three Mile Island, Challenger, and 9/11 were
cosmological events in which sensemaking blind spots were tragically
revealed, drawing our attention to the incompleteness of existing
knowledge. In each case, the unimaginable consequences disrupted
sensemaking. When we face a radically open future, prospective
sensemaking requires that we use the past imaginatively to create
futures that are excluded by existing language. We need to generate
“moving concepts that relax the boundaries of thought and com-
plicate the ways we produce our realities”.120 As Whitehead high-120 Page 156 of: Clegg et al. (2005).
lighted, we “cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of
the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes
of abstraction”.121 Without the constant revision of our modes of ab-121 Page 59 of: Whitehead (1967).
straction we start to think through our language games instead of
into them; resulting in the unquestioned certainty that is ideological
dogmatism.122 The question that needs to be asked is just how we122 Page 56 of: Chia, R. and S. Morgan:
1996, ‘Educating the Philosopher–
Manager: De-Signing the Times’.
Management Learning 27(1), 37–64.
escape our dogmas? Our article aims to encourage others to consider
how this might be achieved, or how we can learn to think differently,
whether through dialogue or other imaginative processes.
Finally, we also need to appreciate that there will be times when
sensemaking fails us, when we are unable to attribute meaning to
events. The central role of language within sensemaking, learning,
and organizing is now central to our understanding of these pro-
cesses. Without language and the stories we create to give meaning
to our shared reality, organizations would not come into existence.
To try and think about the world we inhabit without language is
meaningless. Yet how we deploy our innate linguistic intuition when
sensemaking is disrupted is overlooked in the existing literature. The
role of sensegiving has been recognized, but not how the sensegiver
came to make sense of events. The primary data presented in Maitlis
and Lawrence’s empirical work on sensegiving reveal the importance
of talk, but the work focuses on its role in giving sense, not creating
it.123 Similarly, Garud et al. consider how new narratives are cre-123 Maitlis and Lawrence (2007).
ated, although importantly they highlight the need to further explore
“the cognitive and social mechanisms that enable narrative develop-
ment”.124 We have attempted to do this, emphasizing the generative124 Page 598 of: Garud et al. (2011).
dialogic micro-processes from which new stories emerge and give
sense to experience. Since the early 1990s, the role of dialogue within
organizations has been explored by a range of researchers. We hope
that our contribution will encourage others to explore the essential
role of dialogue in relation to essential organizational activities such
as sensemaking and learning.
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Conclusion
Central to the concept of sensemaking is that through our ongoing
language games both meaning and sense are established along lines
of comprehension that enable us to connect the past, present, and
future. At any stage this process can be disrupted by novel, unex-
pected, and seemingly incomprehensible events. This article is built
upon a simple premise: novel stimuli disrupt sensemaking processes
and trigger an alternative linguistic response that represents a seman-
tic transformation. Semantic transformation requires the creation of
a linguistic space in which new terms are coined and old ones bro-
ken up, combined, and/or redeployed, in an effort to give expression
to the novel circumstances experienced or the new phenomena ob-
served. Such novel responses almost invariably emerge through some
form of dialogue. Furthermore, dialogues take place almost automat-
ically; when pressed by the circumstances experienced, either collec-
tively or singularly we experiment and improvise with the words in
our language games through dialogue. In this way, we are able to do
new things with words so that we are able to better account for the
novel experiences we encounter. Gradually, through multiple itera-
tions within this transformatory process, sensemaking is restored. A
semblance of order is recreated but this time within an entirely dif-
ferent frame of comprehension. When such a transformation occurs,
radical learning has taken place.
Dialogue is inherently plastic and malleable, far more so than any
other form of communication available, and it is this feature that
allows us to experiment and improvise and thereby to transform
meaning. The use of metaphor, particularly in dialogical communi-
cation, is one such way by which we are able to “transport” (Greek
metaphorikos meaning transportation) our thinking and hence stretch
horizons of comprehension beyond the known and the familiar when
faced by the stimulus of novelty. Through dialogical “wayfinding” we
are able to hijack words, combine and recombine them in ways previ-
ously untried, and by doing so twist their original meaning creating
linguistic hybrids that enable us to express what was previously in-
expressible. When our existing stories fall short of our experiences
we learn to speculate about what might be actually happening using
words and phrases in different ways as we stumble and stutter our
way toward a rudimentary but novel form of expressive coherence;
a coherence that may initially sound strange or even absurd but that
gradually becomes more and more reasonable as linguistic connec-
tions are made.
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